Effect of corporate governance on cost of equity before and after international financial reporting standard implementation by Chandra, Situmeang et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Effect of corporate governance on cost of
equity before and after international
financial reporting standard
implementation
Situmeang Chandra and Erlina Erlina and Azhar Maksum
and Tavi Supriana
Universitas Sumatera Utara, Medan, Indonesia
February 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87759/
MPRA Paper No. 87759, posted 8 July 2018 17:03 UTC
1 
 
EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON COST OF EQUITY 
BEFORE AND AFTER INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
REPORTING STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION 
Chandra Situmeang 1, Erlina 2, Azhar Maksum 3 & Tavi Supriana 4 
1) Doctoral Programme School of Economic and Business, Universitas Sumatera Utara, Medan, 
Indonesia.  
2,3,4)  Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Sumatera Utara, Medan, Indonesia 
1Correspondence email: chandrasitumeang@gmail.com 
We suggest you to cite this article as: 
 Situmeang, C., Erlina, Maksum, A., Supriana, A. 2018. Effect of corporate governance on cost of equity 
before and after international financial reporting standard implementation. Junior Scientific Researcher, 
Vol IV, No. 1, pp. 1-13. 
 
Abstract 
The ability to compete between companies at the time of intercompany production efficiency is 
no longer a differentiator, the determinant of competitiveness includes the aspect of funding to be 
one of the determinants of competitiveness. One of the company's competitiveness capabilities is 
determined by the capital cost or the discount rate used in evaluating a project. The higher the 
cost of capital will be the lower the competitiveness of the company. There are many factors that 
determine the cost of a company's capital, but this research focuses only on the aspects of 
Corporate Governance (CG). Investors will assume that the risk in companies that have good CG 
quality will be smaller than companies that do not have good CG quality. On the other hand, 
IFRS implementation has a variety of purposes including improving the implementation of CG in 
a company, so it is theoretically suspected that IFRS implementation will increase CG's influence 
on CoE. The approach used is to study the capability of the linear regression model formed and 
to conduct a comparative analysis among regression models established by data from 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2007-2011 as data prior 
to IFRS implementation and 2012-2015 for data after IFRS implementation. Based on the results 
of data processing obtained evidence that Corporate Governance negatively affect the Cost of 
Equity (CoE). This contradicts the theory because the better the CG value of a firm the CoE will 
be to decrease. When compared to the period before and after IFRS implementation, there is no 
evidence of a relationship between CG and CoE. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Cost of Equity; IFRS 
JEL Codes: D53, E44, F34, H63. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The level of inter-company competition that occurs today is higher without being 
restricted by state borders. This condition requires companies to improve competitiveness 
to survive and thrive in a global business environment. As it becomes easier to duplicate 
products, competitiveness is determined not only by product characteristics, but also by 
internal efficiency in the production process. In this perspective, the company will strive 
to achieve relatively low production costs, so that the company can implement various 
strategies based on price advantage. Efficiency is not only determined by the technical 
process of production, but also determined by the ability to obtain an optimal cost of 
funds. Theoretically, all funds used by the company bear the cost of both capitals derived 
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from the owner and the debt obtained from the creditor. The cost of capital deposited by 
the owner / investor is referred to as the Cost of Equity (CoE) and the cost component of 
the debt obtained from the creditor hereinafter referred to as the Cost of Debt (CoD). The 
focus of this article is the CoE measured by estimation that has a variety of approaches 
(Ross, Westerfield & Jordan, 2010) 
CoE is the risk premium set by the investor for the investments invested in the 
company. The risk premium is determined based on various considerations including 
determined by the quality of information obtained by investors in decision making. Such 
information can be obtained from various sources where the financial statements become 
one of the main sources. If reviewed from the basic purpose of the financial statements is 
to provide information pertaining to the financial position, financial performance, cash 
flow, which is useful for users of the report in economic decision making (Financial 
Statement Presentation and Framing Framework Paragraph 7, PSAK 2010). If the 
financial reporting process runs ideally, financial statements can be an adequate source 
of information for investors to make investment decisions. 
But practically, investors are aware that the financial statements are not fully informed 
of the real conditions that can be used for forecasting future cash flows. This happens 
because investors believe there is a difference in the quality of information they have than 
those of management. As  compensation for such low informative risk, investors 
demanded a higher rate of return because they assume relatively large uncertainties 
(Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, & Schipper, 2012; Song, 2007)  
One of the factors suspected to play a role in increasing the information asymmetry is 
the difference in standards used in various countries. To anticipate this, there is an attempt 
to reduce information asymmetry by designing and encouraging the implementation of 
the same standards worldwide. Preparation of financial statements will give a good 
impact from both sides of the substance of information contained in the financial 
statements will become more standardized around the world and encourage investor 
interpretation with smaller variations because it has a relatively similar reference. Based 
on that, Indonesia began to adopt in 2008 and implemented International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) in 2012. Turki, Wali, & Boujelbene (2016) research who 
sampled companies in Europe concluded that IFRS implementation has been able reduce 
asymmetry information and improve the reliability of financial statements in predicting 
future circumstances. 
One important aspect in reducing information asymmetry is Corporate Governance 
(CG). In addition to the main things that are the objectives of CG such as internal control, 
supervision of strategic policy, etc., one of the things to be achieved is the presentation 
of financial statements that provide complete information so that between management 
and others have the same relative information quality. As a consequence that the financial 
statements which area summary of management performance prepared by management 
then in the process of preparation is vulnerable to arise conflict of interest. In an effort to 
minimize the negative impact of the conflict of interest, a CG mechanism is developed 
that will theoretically reduce the opportunity to take advantage of itself. 
In terms of CG's influence on CoE, several studies with relatively similar results have 
been performed: good enterprise management will reduce CoE (Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, & LaFond, 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Patro & Kanagaraj, 2016; Piot & 
Missonier-Piera, 2010; Strobl, 2013). In contrast, some other studies like Mc Innis (2010) 
and Juniarti & Natalia (2012) study conducted in Indonesia do not support the conclusion 
that a good corporate CG increase will decrease CoC. However, the research results of 
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Juniarti & Natalia (2012) have weaknesses because they only review from companies that 
volunteer to participate in Good Corporate Governance survey. 
The above description ranging from real phenomena in business practices and the 
results of various previous studies both in accordance with the theory and various research 
results that are not in accordance with the theory to make researchers interested in 
analyzing the relationship between the implementation of corporate governance with cost 
of equity. In addition to elaborating on these results, this study also aims to analyze 
whether there are differences in CG relationships to CoE after IFRS implementation. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Cost of Equity (CoE) 
In simple terms, it can be said that Cost of Equity (CoE) is the return expected by 
shareholders by investing funds in the company. Return can be obtained from dividends 
or from the increase in the value of shares owned. Return for investors to be cost for the 
company. Although conceptually it is quite simple, it is very difficult to calculate it 
mathematically. CoE estimation calculations have been studied by many researchers by 
offering several measurements to coefficient CoE. 
As pointed out in the previous section, COE measurements are the measurements that 
many researchers discuss with varying measurement approaches. This is because the 
variable is not fully observable, so the calculation is an estimate that also depends on the 
estimation of other data. Here are some measurements that have been formulated to 
measure CoE; Discounted Dividend Model developed by Gordon & Shapiro, (1956), 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe, (1964), Fama and French Three-Factor 
Model developed by Fama & French (1993) as a refinement of CAPM, residual Income 
Valuation Model Developed by Gebhardt, Lee, & Swaminathan (2001), Claus & Thomas 
Method (CT) built by Claus & Thomas (2001), Value Line Model developed by Brav, 
Lehavy, & Michaely (2005), Price Earning Growth (PEG) Model developed by Easton & 
Monahan (2005), Gode & Mohanram Method (GM) developed by Gode & Mohanram 
(2003) and Modified Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth Method (OJ) developed by Ohlson & 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005)  
B. Corporate Governance (CG) 
Corporate Governance (CG) has attracted many academic and practitioners' interest in 
management and accounting sciences. In the academic area, interest in CG involves a 
multidisciplinary of science that generates a lot of research within this area of study. The 
CG study was initially triggered by the publication of Cadbury's reports in 1992 under 
the terms "good behavior" which contained various indicators to assess the quality of 
corporate CG. Zitouni (2016) states that CG is an effort to establish standards to direct 
the board of directors and related committees to protect the interests of investors and 
provide information needed by all stakeholders. The definition focuses on the process of 
drafting the standards that will be the basis of a good CG implementation. 
Another definition focuses on activities that have been implemented. Rezaee (2008) 
states that CG is a process influenced by regulatory tools, laws, market mechanisms, 
record standards, referral practices and efforts of all parties within the company. Boards 
of directors, auditors, consultants law, financial advisors, and other parties will 
safeguarding interests and increasing shareholder wealth while protecting the interests of 
other stakeholders. 
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The protection of the owner's interests is the problem discussed in agency theory. 
Conflicts of interest that occur between managers and shareholders allegedly have created 
many problems within the company. Various studies have concluded that many crises are 
not only triggered by economic or financial problems but also management issues 
(Segrestin & Hatchuel, 2011; Zollo & Freeman, 2010). As explained in agency theory, 
the problem is triggered because managers often make decisions that do not fully lead to 
an increase in owner wealth. One way to minimize the negative impact is by 
implementing good corporate governance. 
Academics believe that good CG increases the likelihood of executing control 
mechanisms over management so that managers are expected to make decisions to 
achieve the same goals as those of the company owner. Correct CG activities will create 
accountability, improve the reliability of financial information, and strengthen the 
effectiveness of the capital market, thereby increasing investor confidence in making 
decisions (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). CG can be seen as a very important 
instrument not only in the viewpoint of protecting existing owners but also to encourage 
the creation of reliable information for the use of various other parties including 
prospective owners to make decisions on their funds. 
As a result of a large number of internal and external factors affecting good Corporate 
Governance (CG) practices, the CG size varies widely between countries, so it is not 
possible to produce a common definition and measurement tool (Zuckweiler, Rosacker, 
& Hayes, 2016). In the framework of research objectives in the field of CG study, 
measurement of the quality of CG implementation becomes a very important thing. In 
general, measurements can be divided into two types: measurements using a single 
indicator or a combination of several CG indicators as described above and using a 
checklist of a series of indicators derived from those aspect aspects. 
In addition to using the above approach, there is also an approach using multiple single 
measures that are integrated into a measurement index of corporate governance practices.  
Mazzotta & Veltri (2012) uses the number of boards of directors, the number of 
committees under the board of commissioners, the number of independent directors, and 
the number of independent committee members to form the CG corporate quality 
measurement variables. 
C. Implementation of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 
The development of a business that leads to globalization has pushed the need for 
reporting standards so that the financial statements generated by the company can be 
understood globally. The issue of standardization is a major concern that encourages 
accounting stakeholders to seek a breakthrough to achieve that goal. After attempting 
various mechanisms, adoption and harmonization of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) became the way forward to encourage the standardization of financial 
statements. 
Gatsios (Confetti Gatsios, Marcos Da Silva, Jose Ambrozini, Assaf Neto, & Guasti 
Lima, 2016) states that IFRS is a set of accounting standards issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). IFRS aims to produce a high quality typical model 
for international accounting standards to provide information to users of financial 
statements. Ball (Ball, 2006) states clearly that the presentation of financial statements 
based on IFRS will make the financial statements more reliable by investors because it is 
easy to understand so as to reduce information asymmetry. Lee (Lee, Walker, 
Christensen, & Zhao, 2010) expressed a similar opinion that international standards will 
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increase disclosure of information that reduces information asymmetry and thus reduces 
risk.  
In addition to standardization issues, IFRS leads to the improvement of the quality of 
the company's financial statements. Epstein (Epstein & Mirza, 1999) say that IFRS 
requires a high standard, transparency, and capability compared with other financial 
statements to help investors in global markets and other financial statement users. Turkey 
(Turki et al., 2016) emphasizes one of the benefits of IFRS's focus on the fair value 
concept by saying that the concept of fair value facilitates investors who need the most 
up-to-date information in their decision-making as they understand the company's last 
condition for cash forecasting. The two opinions above conclude that IFRS 
implementation will improve the quality of financial statement information. 
Based on the above, theoretically can be said that the implementation of IFRS can 
encourage the reliability of financial statements because the information presented more 
informative and updated. Conceptually this will reduce information asymmetry sourced 
from information differences that are known by management than information that can 
be obtained by investors including one of the financial statement information. This 
theoretical concept has encouraged various studies to test these allegations. 
Several studies focused on examining the impact of IFRS implementation on the 
company. Li's research (Li, 2010) and (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008) show that the 
implementation of IFRS encourages a decrease in the cost of equity borne by the firm. 
Different results are shown by Gao (Gao, 2010) that disclosure of new information 
presented as a result of IFRS implementation can not improve investors' predictive 
capabilities. 
Turkish Research (Turki et al., 2016) states that IFRS implementation contains key 
factor factors that can reduce information asymmetry, thus lowering the cost of equity. 
Mohammadrezaei (Mohammadrezaei, Mohd-Saleh, & Banimahd, 2015) conducted a 
literature study and concluded that the majority of research concludes that IFRS 
implementation reduces information asymmetry which reduces the cost of equity but still 
recognizes that some research has led to different conclusions. 
2.1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
D. Effect of Corporate Governance on Cost of Equity 
Based on agency theory there is a conflict of interest between manager and external 
stakeholder either shareholder or bondholder. Corporate Governance (CG) is one solution 
to minimize the agency problem. Governance mechanisms can reduce conflicts of interest 
so that agency costs can be suppressed. Good CG practice will encourage better 
managerial decisions for the benefit of various internal and external parties. In line with 
research conducted by some research (Hodges, Lin, & Lin, 2014; Lima & Sanvicente, 
2013; Mazzotta & Veltri, 2012; Ramly, 2012; Wu & Lee, 2014) in general result that 
good CG practice will decrease the company's CoE. Research Huang, Dao, & Fornaro 
(2016) also explains that disclosures conducted as one of the proofs of good governance 
implementation can decrease CoE while Zhu (2014) study explains that good governance 
will decrease CoE. 
The CG aspect that is the focus of attention in this research is the internal mechanism. 
This is done because all the variables contained in the model are theoretically influenced 
by the internal mechanism. In line with the explanation in research conducted by 
Mazzotta & Veltri (2012) aspects of CG attributes that affect the cost of capital is; the 
size of the board of directors, the independence of the board of directors, the existence of 
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committees under the board of commissioners, and the independence of those 
committees. In addition to these indicators in line with various other studies, this study 
adds attributes of the board of commissioners and the independence of the board of 
commissioners. The board of commissioners will theoretically influence internal 
mechanisms within the company. Based on the above explanation, this study suggests 
that the better CG implementation of a company will decrease CoE. 
E. Influence Implementation International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
Implementation of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) will be used as 
a subset variable forming sample. This means that the researchers suspect there will be 
differences in influence between variables studied before and after the implementation of 
IFRS. This is driven by the IFRS development concept that seeks to reduce information 
asymmetry [(Ball, 2006), ((Epstein & Mirza, 1999; Lee et al., 2010)]. The decrease in 
information asymmetry is derived from improving the quality of information and more 
complete disclosure. Not only have an effect on information asymmetry, but IFRS 
implementation based on various empirical studies is also able to decrease the cost of 
equity (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010)  
The separation of this sub-sample is also very much in line with the results of 
(Mohammadrezaei et al., 2015; Nurzaimah et al., (2016) and  (Turki et al., 2016) that 
there are significant differences in accounting practice in the areas studied in each of these 
studies. Due to the compatibility between these various empirical studies with the 
objective of IFRS implementation to reduce information asymmetry then this research 
will conduct the multigroup procedure to obtain empirical evidence that implementation 
IFRS gives a difference for the influence between the variables studied. This procedure 
will be performed for all pathways to and from the information asymmetry variable. 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 Quantitative research is the research that is intended to express the symptoms in a 
holistic-contextual manner through the collection of data from the natural setting by using 
the researcher self as a key instrument. Quantitative research is descriptive and tends to 
use inductive approach analysis. Process and meaning are more highlighted in qualitative 
research. Quantitative research is more prominent in the form of a narrative that is creative 
and deep and shows the characteristics of naturalistic full of authentic values (Lutfi et al., 
2016; Sihombing et al., 2017; Muda et al.,&  2017 2018). This study was conducted on 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period of 
observation 2007 to 2016. The sample companies were selected as many as 65 companies 
with the number of observed financial statements of 650 10-year financial statements. 
The CoE measurements in this study will follow the approach that can be used is the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964) with the following formula: 
𝐶𝑜𝐸 = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) 
Rf: risk free rate 
Rm: market return 
β: beta saham 
 
The measurement of corporate governance in this study followed the research of 
Mazzotta & Veltri (2012) by making some modifications based on the input of several 
other studies. The focus of measurement is the internal mechanism of the company. Based 
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on these studies, it was stated that in the examination study of governance effectiveness 
of CoE empirically better by using CG attribute related to internal mechanism. Based on 
this, then compiled the following calculation steps: 
1. The first dummy variable is the number of boards of commissioners. It is rated "1" if 
the total number of boards is greater than the median sample of the company during 
the study period and the value of "0" otherwise. 
2. The second dummy variable is the number of boards of directors. It is rated "1" if the 
number of boards of directors is greater than the median sample of the company during 
the study period and rated "0" otherwise. 
3. The third dummy variable is the number of independent board of commissioners. It is 
rated "1" if the number of independent board of commissioners is greater than the 
median sample of the company during the study period and rated "0" otherwise. 
4. The fourth dummy variable is the proportion of independent board of commissioners. 
It is rated "1" if the proportion of independent commissioners is greater than the 
median sample of the company during the study period and is rated "0" otherwise. 
5. The fifth dummy variable is the number of independent board of directors. Rated "1" 
if the number of independent board of directors is greater than the median sample of 
the company during the study period and assigned a value of "0" otherwise. 
6. The sixth dummy variable is the proportion of the independent board of directors. It is 
rated "1" if the proportion of the independent board of directors is greater than the 
median sample of the company during the study period and rated "0" otherwise. 
7. The seventh dummy variable is the number of committees brought by the board of 
commissioners. In general, the company has the following committees: audit 
committee, remuneration committee, and nomination committee. The value "1" is 
given if the number of committees held is greater than the median value, and is 
assigned a value of "0" otherwise. 
8. The eighth dummy variable is the proportion of the number of committee members 
under the board of commissioners declared independent. The value "1" will be 
assigned if the number of committees held by one company is above the median value, 
and is rated zero otherwise. 
 The entire dummy value is then summed so that the minimum value is "0" and the 
maximum value is "8" 
 Hypothesis testing will be used with regression analysis whereas to see the effect of 
IFRS implementation will use regression analysis with dummy variable.  
CoE = α1 + α2CG + α3IFRS + α4CGxIFRS 
CoE: Cost of Equity  
CG: Corporate Governance 
IFRS: Internasional Finansial Reporting Standar Implementation 
 
 Period between 2012 to 2016 when IFRS has been implemented will be rated “1” while 
the period 2006 to 2011 when IFRS has not been implemented will be rated “0” 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSION 
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The first descriptive analysis of the accumulated data supports the allegation that there 
are very varied funding characteristics between one company and another. This condition 
certainly makes the competitiveness between companies tend to be very varied. Based on 
Figure 3, we get some other features. CoE movement does not fully describe or conform 
to the risk-free interest rate seen from the BI rate chart pattern. Other results also show 
that the value of Premium Risk which is the difference between CoE and risk free interest 
rate is not always the same between years. If further analyzed, the data indicate that in the 
CoE determination, the risk of a riskable country's economy with a risk-free rate is not a 
single measure that affects but is also influenced by market risks attached to specific risky 
investments such as stocks. Furthermore, descriptive analysis of the data has been 
obtained. The descriptive statistics contained in figure 1 and figure 2 show a trend 
indicating that there has been an increase in CG implementation. It is quite logical because 
the various CG attributes that were originally voluntary changed into mandatory so that 
the company must fulfill that aspect. On the other hand, the coefficient of CG variation is 
quite large which means that the quality of CG implementations between firms tends to 
vary. However, the trend of the variation coefficient value as shown in graph 5.5 has 
decreased so there is a suspicion that the implementation process of IFRS encourages the 
standardization of governance. This will then be elaborated in path analysis testing and 
multigroup analysis.826/5000 
Source: Data Analysis Results 
FIGURE 1. AVERAGE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (CG) 
 
 
Source: Data Analysis Results 
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FIGURE 2. COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF QUALITY OF CG 
 
 
Source: Data Analysis Results 
FIGURE 3. COE AVERAGE YEAR VERSUS RISK-FREE INTEREST RATE (BI RATE) 
 
Other analysis result obtained from descriptive analysis is even though trend line 
formed still looks like movement of cycle down and up, but in research period seen down 
trend. This is in line with national economic policies that seek to reduce the cost of funds 
used by the company. The decline in the cost of funds is one of the efforts to improve the 
competitiveness of national companies especially in the era of globalization where 
companies compete openly with companies from abroad. Another thing to note from the 
above descriptive analysis is to compare between the risk free data of each year contained 
in figure 3 with the average return market. The difference between risk free and market 
return ranges from 6% to 17%. This difference is a description of the excess return desired 
by investors as compensation for the risk borne by investing in risky securities. After 
testing the data based on the methodology described earlier, results are obtained as shown 
in table 1.  
TABLE 1 RESULTS SUMMARY 
Description Item Value Sig 
Model Summary R2 0.034  
Anova F 8,724 0.000 
Coeficient 
(Unstandardized Coefficients) 
Contant 0,147 0.000 
CG 0,009 0,001 
IFRS 0.024 0,035 
CG*IFRS -0.004 0,223 
5. DISCUSSION 
In general, the regression model tested in this study has a very low coefficient of 
determination of 3.4%. The coefficient of determination of that indicates that the 
independent variable of Corporate Governance (CG) does not contribute significantly in 
the formation of Cost of Equity (CoE). Nevertheless, the results of the ANOVA test 
indicate that the proposed model is significant enough to explain the formation of CoE. 
In general, the value of determination coefficient in capital market research, especially 
using only one free variable is relatively low. This is because the factors that influence 
the formation of a variable in the capital market involve many other variables. 
The focus of this study is not to obtain a large coefficient of determination but to test 
whether CG influences the CoE. In addition, the focus of the study is to review whether 
10 
 
there is a change in the relationship between CG and COE before and after IFRS 
implementation. Both of these are the goals and focus of the study. Based on the above 
results can be seen pahwa CG effect on CoE because p value of CG coefficient of 0.001. 
However, the effect is contrary to the theory because it should be when the value of CG 
has increased the value of CoE will decrease. Indeed, if analyzed from the increase of 
0.9%, this value is relatively small when compared to increase and decrease the value of 
one unit of CG by using the mechanism used in this study. Compared with descriptive 
analysis, it is true that the upward trend in CG increments throughout the study period 
does not have the same trend with fluctuating COE values over time. In testing whether 
the IFRS implementation of changing the relationship between CG and CoE can be 
analyzed by looking at the significance values of IFRS and CGxIFRS variables. If the 
coefficients of these two variables are significant, it can be concluded that the IFRS 
implementation has changed the CG relationship to CoE. But in this study based on the 
results of data processing shown in table 1 shows that only IFRS variable coefficients that 
proved significant while the CGxIFRS variable coefficient not proved significant. Then 
the conclusion that can be drawn is that the implementation of IFRS has no effect on CG 
relationship to CoE. This result needs further elaboration to find whether there are other 
variables that moderate the relationship between the two variables. This is the focus of 
further research in this study. 
Nevertheless, these results have indicated that improving the implementation of CG 
especially in the period after IFRS implementation does not directly impact the CoE 
decline. This is probably due to the increase in the value of CG due to the fulfillment of 
the normative aspects of the CG gauge but basically the substantive aspect of the CG 
implementation is not actually achieved. This has prompted the need for the various 
stakeholders who formulate CG implementation policies to pay more attention. 
Related to that, there are some recommendations that can be given. First, professional 
associations need to encourage an audit process that is capable of reviewing whether CG 
is effectively implemented. Assessment should not be focused on the normative aspect 
only. Auditors can provide a complete review of CG implementation on a company. 
Another thing that can be done is a joint effort in order to have an independent agency 
that routinely evaluates the entire CG enterprise implementation completely. This 
Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) which has already started to be known 
in Indonesia needs to be improved in its analytical coverage because it has only been 
evaluating some companies in a limited way so that the results are less reliable by the 
community. 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Based on the results of data processing and discussion conducted in the previous section 
can be concluded that Corporate Governance (CG) effect on the Cost of Equity (CoE). 
However, the allegation that the implementation of International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) will increase CG's influence on CoE cannot be proven so that it can be 
concluded that IFRS implementation cannot reduce the CoE of manufacturing companies 
in Indonesia. 
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